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Abstract
We estimate a flexible reduced form dynamic model of schooling
choices and labor market outcomes in France. Our analysis focuses
on the comparison between second-generation immigrants and their
French-natives counterparts. We show that the gap in higher edu-
cation attainments between those two sub-populations is mainly ex-
plained by parents’ background, and that schooling investment is the
main determinant of the gap in permanent employment. After condi-
tioning on schooling and observed characteristics, we find that ethnic
origin explains less than 6% of the gap in access to permanent employ-
ment. A test of equality of counterfactual probabilities of accessing
permanent employment across ethnic groups (measured at identical
individual characteristics) typically fails to be rejected.
JEL classification: I2, J15, J24, J41
Keywords: Second-generation immigrants, schooling attainments, fixed
term employment.
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1 Introduction
Continental European labor markets are characterized by a relatively low de-
gree of flexibility, when compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. This is particu-
larly the case for France and Italy (OECD, 1999, Table 2.2). This inflexibility
is acute at the firing level. In practice, it implies that individuals holding
employment must be paid relatively high severance pay when employment
downsizing is necessary.1 As a consequence, firms may be reluctant to grant
permanent contracts to new hires and favor Fixed Term Contracts (FTCs).2
This theoretical prediction is largely supported by the data. About 70% of
newly hired workers in the French labor market get a Fixed Term Contract
for their first job, although the share of Fixed Term Contracts in total em-
ployment is 14% (INSEE, Enqueˆte emploi, 2005). For the sake of comparison,
the share of FTCs is 15% for all the EU25 countries (5.8% in the UK and
34% in Spain, where this proportion is the largest (European-Commission,
2007).
At the same time, the high incidence of criminal activities and social
turmoil in areas densely populated with immigrants has pushed French policy
makers to question the level of integration of second-generation immigrants.
In 1999, the unemployment rate of second-generation immigrants aged 19-29
was 30% (nearly 40% if the parents came from Algeria or Morocco), whereas
it was 20% for children with both parents born in France. This inequality
is also noticeable at the level of early career employment contracts. For
instance, only 23% of second-generation immigrants with both parents born
in an African country get a Permanent Contract (PC) for their first job
compared to 32% for young workers with both parents born in France.
Surprisingly, and despite the recent incidence of violent crimes in French
suburban regions, very few economists have investigated the relative perfor-
mance of second-generation immigrants in France. Using population survey
data, Aeberhardt et al. (in press) find that (i) one third of the wage gap
and (ii) one half of the employment probability difference between individ-
uals born from French parents and individuals having at least one parent
of African origin, cannot be explained by observed characteristics. Using
1A vast literature deals with the impact of employment protection legislation (in partic-
ular firing costs) on unemployment and labor mobility (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990;
Bertola, 1990; Garibaldi, 1998; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
2Indeed, there is a considerable amount of debate going on between European countries
about the optimal level of job and social security that the European economy can stand.
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matched employer-employee data, Aeberhardt and Pouget (2007) conclude
that (endogenous) occupation is an important determinant of the French-
natives/second-generation immigrants wage gap, after controlling for educa-
tion, experience and background, leaving a small support for wage discrimi-
nation. Both papers are based on econometric models in which schooling is
assumed to be exogenous.
While discrimination is often advanced as a possible explanation for the
relatively poor performances of second-generation immigrants, potential dif-
ferences in pre-market skill investment (such as differences in education) may
also be important. As an example, only 19% of African-natives get a univer-
sity diploma, whereas this proportion is 46% among French-natives. From an
economist perspective, differences in early career outcomes between natives
and second-generation immigrants, which persist after conditioning on edu-
cation, are particularly interesting because they are difficult to justify from a
standard theoretical perspective. It is those differences that are particularly
important to quantify in order to evaluate the incidence of racial discrimina-
tion. As of now, no one has investigated whether or not the employment and
wage gaps are only the mirror image of a schooling gap that exists between
French-natives and second-generation immigrants. Answering this question
is fundamental. If differences in labor market outcomes between second gen-
eration immigrants and French-natives are explained solely by differences in
human capital, public policies should be mostly targeted at reducing the
schooling gap. If not, policies that guarantee equal access to permanent
employment would also need to be designed.
This is precisely the question that we address in this paper. In line with
(semi) structural modeling, we build a model in which both the causal and
the spurious effects of individual educational choices on early labor market
outcomes are separately identifiable. We focus on the nature of early career
employment contracts and more precisely on whether the term of the contract
is fixed (limited) or permanent (unlimited).
We consider two sub-populations that are indexed by the country of origin
of the parents: “French-natives” (those born in France for whom both parents
were born in France with French citizenship), and “African-natives” (those
born in France for whom both parents were born in an African country with
a non-French citizenship). Our general objective is to explain schooling and
employment outcomes of African and French-natives.
We ask the following questions. First, controlling for parental back-
ground, does ethnic origin influence schooling attainments? Second, given
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observed characteristics and educational attainments, are employment con-
tract outcomes affected by ethnic origin? Third, would French-natives and
second-generation immigrants differ in their access rate to permanent em-
ployment if both observed characteristics and educational attainments were
equalized?
Although our analysis is targeted toward the French labor market, the
issues raised in this paper are far from being specific to France. The poor
performance of second-generation immigrants has also attracted attention in
European countries, like Denmark (Nielsen et al., 2003) and the Netherlands
(Van Ours and Veenman, 2003).3
At a more methodological level, our semi-structural approach is also novel
in this segment of the literature applied to labor markets of second-generation
immigrants. Until now, the literature has been rather descriptive. Unlike
fully structural models, our model does not explicitly specify individual pref-
erences and subjective probability distributions that characterize individual
beliefs about labor market functioning. Our results can therefore be sup-
ported by many potential behavioral assumptions. We choose to interpret
our findings within a framework where agents are forward looking and have
a full knowledge of the economic environment.
We now summarize the main findings. First, African-natives are slightly
under-educated, after conditioning on their observable characteristics. Eth-
nic origin accounts for a small portion (5%) of the probability of getting a
higher education diploma, whereas delay during primary school and parents’
occupation account for 40% each.
Second, schooling attainments explain around 60% of the likelihood of
permanent employment and parents’ occupation is responsible of 20%. Eth-
nic origin accounts only for 3% to 6%.
Third, after controlling for observed characteristics and schooling attain-
ments, we find no evidence that African-natives experience a lower perma-
nent employment probability. Indeed, point estimates indicate that African-
natives have a higher permanent employment probability in their first job
when they graduate with an advanced university degree, than their French-
natives counterparts. At all other grade levels, equality in access to per-
manent employment in a first job fails to be rejected. When employment
3In the United States, the economic performances of second-generation immigrants
appear to have been much better. For instance, Chiswick and DebBurman (2004) and
Card (2005) find no gap in schooling attainments and wages between second-generation
immigrants and US-natives.
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outcomes measured two years after school completion are considered, equal-
ity in permanent employment probabilities fails to be rejected at all possible
grade level.
In the following section, we discuss the motivation behind our econometric
model. In Section 3, we introduce the database used in this article. The
econometric model is described in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss model
selection and goodness of fit. We present the results about the determinants
of schooling attainments and employment outcomes in Sections 6 and 7.
A formal test of equality of permanent employment probabilities between
French and African-natives is presented in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 is
devoted to an interpretation of the results and to concluding remarks.
2 Motivating the Econometric Analysis
We estimate a reduced-form dynamic model of education and early career
outcomes. The model is in the spirit of Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001).
Precisely, we model individual trajectories as a collection of sequential dy-
namic discrete choices. The model captures three essential features of in-
dividual human capital decisions. The first one is the sequential aspect of
schooling decisions. The second feature is the dynamic impact of school-
ing on post-schooling outcomes (the model allows education choices to affect
post-schooling choices even after conditioning on unobserved heterogeneity).
Finally, the third feature is the degree of heterogeneity that characterizes the
effects of schooling on labor market outcomes.
The model may be described as follows. At each grade level, the individ-
uals are allowed to choose within a set that contains 4 options: i) continue
to the next grade, ii) accept a Permanent Contract (PC), iii) accept a Fixed
Term Contract (FTC), or iv) withdraw from the labor force (a residual state).
So, given a completed grade level, each choice (each element in the set) has
its own latent utility equation, which is parameterized as a function of a large
set of parental background variables and unobserved heterogeneity. As in a
standard Roy model, there exists a different set of equations for each possible
grade level. This model allows us to measure separate effects of education
levels on the employment outcome probabilities. For instance, the effect of
completed education on the likelihood of a particular early career outcome
(say obtaining a permanent contract) is not captured by a single parameter,
but by a collection of several parameters characterizing individual unobserved
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abilities, and other parameters measuring the effect of parents’ occupation,
location and geographical origin on a given outcome. As a consequence, the
model contains a very large number of parameters.
At a more philosophical level, the model may be labeled as semi-structural,
since it is not based on a formal utility maximization procedure. It therefore
has both the advantages and disadvantages that characterize semi-structural
modeling. For instance, it retains the sequential/dynamic nature, but obvi-
ates the need to numerically solve value functions. It is important to note
that, because the model is explicitly dynamic, it cannot realistically be esti-
mated by popular experimental (IV) techniques (the most popular method
of estimation among empirical labor economists).4 However, because it does
not estimate explicit preferences and does not specify individual subjective
beliefs about outcomes, results are typically open to a larger set of possible
interpretations, than pure structural models.
One natural interpretation is that the latent utility is the reduced-form of
some choice-specific Bellman equations of a rational/forward looking agent
who behaves within a dynamic environment.5 In applied labor economics,
racial differences in labor market outcomes are practically never analyzed
within a structural framework.
Keane and Wolpin (2000) investigate the black/white differential in school-
ing attainments and show that the schooling/occupation choice model devel-
oped in Keane and Wolpin (1997) may also be used to fit the behavior of
young black males. The model is fitted on a sample of black and white males
taken from the NLSY 79. Basically, the authors find that, by allowing for
different skill endowments at age 16 (allowing for different type proportions)
and for different skill rental prices for blacks and whites (a racial indica-
tor binary variable in the Mincer wage function), their model is capable of
explaining schooling attainments of young blacks. They conclude that differ-
ences in initial endowments, along with racial discrimination, can explain the
relatively low schooling attainments of blacks and that there is no evidence
that young blacks fail to behave as forward looking agents. An interesting
result is that, when discount rates are estimated separately for blacks and
4This is simply because both schooling and post-schooling outcomes are assumed en-
dogenous. The link between standard static models popular in empirical labor economics,
and dynamic life-cycle models is discussed in Belzil (2007), Keane (in press) and Belzil
and Hansen (2008).
5Obviously, other behavioral assumptions such as myopic choices, non-separable prefer-
ences (with respect to time), imperfect information, and others, would also be admissible.
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whites, they are quite similar (around 0.93 per year).6
The role of discrimination in the black/white wage differential is also an-
alyzed in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). They build an equilibrium search
model in which blacks and whites differ by their unobserved productivity
levels and their labor search intensities. Discrimination is specified as a po-
tential disutility factor in employing black workers, introduced in the utility
function of employers (a taste for discrimination). Within this theoretical
framework, they show that data on wages, employment and unemployment
durations allow to separately identify the wage differential due to discrimi-
nation and the differential due to productive heterogeneity. They find that
56% of firms have a disutility factor and that this factor is equal to 31% of
the white’s productivity level. Moreover, they estimate that the productivity
level of black workers is 3.3% lower than that of withes’.
3 The Data: Ge´ne´ration 98
Our work is based on Ge´ne´ration 98, a large scale survey conducted in France
by Ce´req.7 It provides detailed information on the socio-demographic back-
ground and employment characteristics of young individuals who left school
in the year 1998 and were interviewed in early 2001. Re-interviews have
been conducted for half of the sample in 2003, but we do not use them since
we focus on employment conditions during the first two years after school
completion. The aim of Ge´ne´ration 98 is to document many aspects of early
labor market transitions. In particular, Ge´ne´ration 98 provides information
on spells of employment, unemployment, and training experienced between
school completion (labor market entrance) and the date of the survey. There-
fore, information on three years of the generation’s working life is available
and each period of employment is well documented. The personal labor mar-
ket history of survey respondents has been reconstructed, month by month,
during the period 1998-2001.
Because Ge´ne´ration 98 is a national survey of those who left the educa-
tional system at a particular point in time (1998), all individuals faced the
same labor market conditions after 1998.
6This finding is particularly interesting in light of the common claim that young indi-
vidual belonging to minorities (at least in the US) tend to have very high discount rates
(see the discussion in Keane and Wolpin, 2000).
7French Center for Research on Education, Training and Employment.
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3.1 Parents’ Country of Origin
Our sample is composed of 42,674 individuals. The group of French-natives
contains 40,525 individuals born in France, whose both parents were also born
in France with the French citizenship at birth. The second group is composed
of 2,149 African-natives, i.e. individuals born in France whose both parents
were born in an African country without the French citizenship at birth.
Individuals belonging to this last group are also called second-generation
immigrants from Africa.
3.2 Education
In order to model education, we use the highest educational level (reached in
1998). The educational level variable falls in 7 categories: 1) no qualification;
2) vocational high school degree; 3) high school degree (baccalaure´at, A level);
4) some university (without graduating); 5) technical or vocational higher ed-
ucation degree or first degree in university (baccalaure´at and 2 years); 6) in-
termediate university degree (baccalaure´at and 3 or 4 years) and 7) advanced
university degree (baccalaure´at and 5 years), elite business or engineering
school degrees.
3.3 Employment Contracts
The data contain information on the nature of the employment contract at
the beginning of each employment spell, as well as changes in the contract
type within the spells. A variety of contract types exist in the French legisla-
tion. They can be classified into two categories, distinguished by their term,
defined when the contract is signed by the employer and the employee.
Contracts for which no duration is set when the contract is signed are as-
signed to the Permanent Contract (PC) category. This category is composed
of contracts held by civil servants and of indefinite term contracts (Contrats
a` Dure´e Inde´termine´e, CDI ) in the private sector.
The second category is called Fixed Term Contract (FTC). It regroups all
contracts whose term is defined when the contract is signed: contracts with
limited duration (Contrats a` Dure´e De´termine´e, CDD), subsidized contracts
(jobs depending on public youth schemes), apprenticeship contracts and self-
employment contracts.
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3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the education level and the employ-
ment contracts, as well as individual characteristics used in the econometric
analysis. It shows that African-natives are much less educated than French-
natives: more than one grade level of difference on average. More precisely,
29% of French-natives have at most a vocational high school degree (grade
levels 1 and 2) and 46% get a higher education diploma (grade levels 5 to
7), whereas, for African-natives, those proportions are respectively 54% and
19%. French-natives are also more often employed in Permanent Contracts
(23% for the first contract vs. 14% for African-natives, and 42% vs. 24% for
the contract two years after school completion) and less often unemployed
(16% and 17% vs. 27% and 30%).
Concerning individual socio-economic characteristics, fathers born in an
African country are more often employed in low-skilled jobs: 53% are blue-
collar workers (this proportion is 21% for fathers born in France). This
observation also stands for mothers: two thirds of mothers born in Africa
are housewives, whereas 52% of mothers born in France are white collar.
Children of African immigrants are living almost essentially in urban areas
and the proportion of individuals delayed during primary school8 is twice as
high for African-natives as it is for French-natives.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
4 The Econometric Model
We model schooling decisions as a sequential dynamic discrete choice model.
At each grade level, individuals are assumed to make a choice between ob-
taining more schooling and labor market work. We model three different
post-schooling outcomes: i) employed in a Permanent Contract (PC), ii) em-
ployed in a Fixed Term Contract (FTC) and iii) out of the labor force (Out),
a residual state.9
8Individuals delayed during primary school are those who enter secondary school after
being 11 years old, which is the “normal” age at which children attain this level without
schooling delay.
9We do not distinguish here between unemployed workers who choose not to work, and
unemployed workers who are searching for a job.
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Because the model is interpreted as the reduced-form of a more involved
structure, the terms “choices” and “outcomes” may be used interchange-
ably.10
To estimate the model, we use several observable factors: parents’ oc-
cupation, location (represented by a binary variable indicating whether the
individual lives in an urban area in 1998), gender and a variable “late at
school”, indicating grade repetition during primary school, and which acts
as a proxy for early cognitive skills. On top of these observable variables,
we have to introduce an individual unobserved time invariant heterogene-
ity term, in order to control for educational selectivity. Indeed, there are
unobservable factors, such as motivation or ability, that influence schooling
decisions at each grade level. Cameron and Heckman (1998) explain that ig-
noring these effects creates an omitted variable bias that understates the true
effects of family background variables on educational attainments, especially
at higher grades. Indeed, ability and family characteristics are negatively
correlated at higher grades: individuals with low family background charac-
teristics continue schooling only if they have a high ability.
As in Cameron and Heckman (2001), the model is specified as a sequence
of multinomial logistic probabilities with unobserved heterogeneity. Let C
be the set of choices at the end of each grade level:
C = {s, c1, c2, c3} .
c1, c2 and c3 are the 3 employment outcomes (respectively employed in a
permanent job, employed in a fixed term job and out of the labor force),
whereas s corresponds to continuing schooling to the next grade level.11 At
the end of grade g, g = 1, . . . , 7, where 1 is the lowest grade, the optimal
choice for an individual i is the following:
ĉi,g = arg max
c∈C
{
U∗i,g,c
}
,
where U∗i,g,c is the utility from choosing option c, given completion of grade
g. The expression of this latent variable is given by:
U∗i,g,c = Xiβg,c + νi,g,c,
10For instance, the data does not allow us to distinguish individuals who accept a Fixed
Term Contract because they received no Permanent Contract offer from those who actually
accept a Fixed Term Contract over a permanent one.
11At the highest grade, s is excluded from the choice set since continuing schooling is
impossible.
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where Xi is a vector of observed variables, βg,c is a vector of parameters
measuring the effects of these variables, and νi,g,c is unobservable by the
econometrician.
The structure adopted for νi,g,c is
νi,g,c = αg,cθi + i,g,c,
where θi is the individual specific effect, constant across grades and contrac-
tual outcomes, and which is orthogonal to the i.i.d. error term, denoted i,g,c.
This particular form implies an individual-grade-outcome specific intercept
term, γi,g,c = αg,cθi.
Then, assuming that i,g,c is an i.i.d. extreme value variable, we can write
the probability that an individual i exits to the outcome c once he achieved
grade g as an extension of McFadden (1974)’s conditional logit model:
Pr (Di,g,c = 1|Xi, θi) =

exp (Xiβg,c + γi,g,c)
1 +
∑c3
a=c1
exp (Xiβg,a + γi,g,a)
for c = c1, . . . , c3
1
1 +
∑c3
a=c1
exp (Xiβg,a + γi,g,a)
for c = s
,
where Di,g,c = 1 if individual i’s outcome after grade g is c ∈ C, i.e. if ĉi,g = c.
The probability that individual i exits to the optimal outcome cˆ, after
having completed the optimal grade level gˆ defines the contribution to the
likelihood for an individual i. Precisely, the individual likelihood is
Li(Xi, θi) =
gˆ−1∏
b=1
Pr (Di,b,s = 1|Xi, θi)
 · Pr (Di,gˆ,cˆ = 1|Xi, θi) ,
where Di,b,s is an indicator that is equal to 1 when an individual i, who has
already completed grade level b, chooses to continue in school (chooses option
s).
Unobserved Heterogeneity
In the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984), we adopt a discrete distribution
for unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming that there are K types in the pop-
ulation,12 the probabilities associated to the K types are specified as logistic
12In what follows, we estimate the model with different values of K, and determine the
optimal number of types using a Bayesian Information Criterion.
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transforms:
pk =
exp qk∑K
s=1 exp qs
k = 1, . . . , K,
where qks are parameters to be estimated, with the restriction that qK = 0.
Given we use an individual-grade-outcome specific intercept term in our
model specification, γi,g,c = αg,cθi, the K types distribution induces the es-
timation of K type specific intercepts for each outcome equation at each
schooling level, which implies the following:
pk = Pr(γi,1,s = γ
k
1,s, γi,2,s = γ
k
2,s, . . . , γi,7,c3 = γ
k
7,c3
) k = 1, . . . , K.
Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity in our model has to be interpreted
as a vector of schooling and labor market unobserved skills, ability or motiva-
tion, whose dimension is K times the number of latent equations modeled.13
As a consequence, the mixed likelihood, for an individual i, is simply:
Li (Xi) =
K∑
k=1
pk · Lki (Xi),
where Lki (Xi) is the contribution of the likelihood for an individual of type
k.
The model is estimated by maximization of the sum of all individual
(mixed) log likelihoods.
5 Model Selection and Goodness of Fit
Two versions of the model are estimated. In the first one, the contractual
outcomes correspond to the contract types at the beginning of the first job
spell that follows school completion, up to 1 year. As a consequence, the
“out of the labor force” outcome concerns individuals who have no job during
the year that follows their exit from schooling. In the second version, the
outcomes correspond to the employment status exactly two years after school
completion.
For each version, the model is estimated separately for French and African-
natives. Therefore, each ethnic group has its own unobserved heterogeneity
13“School continuation” is the outcome of reference at the end of each grade level.
Therefore, there are 3 latent utility equations modeled at the end of each of the 7 grade
levels, corresponding to the 3 employment outcomes.
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distribution and parameters. In both ethnic groups, a relatively small num-
ber of individuals choose to stop schooling at the end of the first education
level (no qualification). Thus, we do not model employment contract out-
comes at this level. As a consequence, the choice set at the end of the first
education level is either continuing or stopping schooling.
The estimation output of one set of employment outcomes for one sub-
sample consists of a huge set of estimated parameters. A 2 type unobserved
heterogeneity distribution requires the estimation of 271 parameters (290 for
a 3 type distribution and 309 for a 4 type distribution). The calculation
of the effects of interest, such as the impact of attaining a schooling level
on the probability of a particular employment outcome, is not summarized
by a single parameter. Instead, it involves the combination of parameters
associated to unobserved heterogeneity and parameters measuring the effect
of observable characteristics.
Before analyzing the main results, we discuss a few technical points such
as unobserved heterogeneity and goodness of fit.
5.1 Model Selection
In line with what is the most common practice, we use an information crite-
rion in order to determine the optimal number of types.14 We do so because
standard test statistics are not formally applicable in a context where some
parameters are at the boundary of the parameter space under the null hy-
pothesis. Although Andrews (2001) has developed a set of non-standard tests
that may be applied in a context where the econometrician is testing for a
degenerate heterogeneity factor (testing if the variance of the cross-sectional
dispersion factor is null), this is not really applicable here because we choose
to disregard a model specification without unobserved heterogeneity (without
educational selectivity).
Table 2 reports the likelihood and the Bayesian Information Criterion
values when the model is estimated with 2, 3 and 4 types for each origin
group and each set of employment outcomes (first outcome within the first
year and outcome at two years). The lowest value of the Bayesian Information
Criterion is obtained with a 2 type distribution for each specification; we
therefore adopt this distribution to analyze the results.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
14This is also achieved in Cameron and Heckman (2001).
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5.2 Goodness of Fit
From the parameter estimates, we compute the simulated schooling grade
attainments and employment outcomes in each sub-sample. Tables 3 and
4 report the simulated distributions for each type. For both ethnic groups,
the actual and average simulated distributions are very close to each other.
Indeed, our model is capable of explaining both schooling attainments and
employment outcomes almost perfectly. The evident capacity of the model
to fit the data is most likely a by-product of its flexibility.
The type specific patterns are very different within each sub-sample,
which confirms the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
For French-natives, type 2 individuals tend to reach higher schooling attain-
ments: their average grade is around grade level 5 (first 2 years in higher
education), whereas it is only 3.6 for type 1s, and their distribution is more
oriented towards high education levels. Type 2 individuals are also less often
employed in Fixed-Term Contracts (53% vs. 65% for the first contract, and
30% vs. 48% for the contract at two years).
For African-natives, the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity
and schooling is less clear: the difference between type 1s and 2s’ average
grades is only 0.3 and the mode of the distribution is grade level 2 for type
1s and grade level 1 for type 2s. Concerning the employment outcomes, it
turns out that type 2 individuals are much less often firstly employed in PCs
(8% vs. 22%), and more often unemployed (35% vs. 14%), whereas at two
years, they are more concerned by permanent employment (35% vs. 18%).
[TABLE 3 HERE]
[TABLE 4 HERE]
6 Explaining Schooling Decisions
In this section, we study the determinants of schooling attainments. As a first
step, we focus on the determinants within ethnic groups. This allows us to
quantify the importance of each factor. Subsequently, we focus on differences
between ethnic groups and, in particular, we investigate if second-generation
immigrants tend to obtain more or less schooling than their French-natives
counterparts, after conditioning on observed characteristics.
Throughout this section, we focus on the attainment of three potential
grade levels: high school completion (which corresponds to reaching level 3 or
15
more), higher education graduation (level 5 or more) and advanced university
degree (level 7).
6.1 Determinants Within Ethnic Groups
At each grade level, the decision of continuing schooling to the next grade is
explained by observable characteristics (parents’ occupation, location, gen-
der and “late at school”) as well as unobserved heterogeneity. In order to
assess the relative impact of those different factors, we perform a variance de-
composition of schooling attainments. Thus, we regress the simulated grade
attainment dummies on each group of explanatory factors separately and
compute the relative share of each group in explaining the grade attainment
as the ratio of the corresponding R2 over the sum of R2s of each regression.
Table 5 contains the results of this variance decomposition for French
and African-natives separately. Parents’ occupation is a key determinant
of the schooling attainments, especially at high grades: it explains 52 and
55% of the variance of reaching an advanced university degree for French
and African-natives respectively, whereas it accounts for 21% and 8% of the
variance of reaching high school completion. This pattern illustrates the fact
that parents’ skills and income play a minor role in obtaining low grades, and
their importance increases at higher grades, where educational investment
becomes more costly.15
The results confirm the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in ex-
plaining schooling attainments for French-natives, where its relative share
ranges from 23% to 33%. This share is lower for African-natives (8% to
25%).
Early cognitive skills, proxied by the variable “late at school”, are also
an important determinant of schooling attainments (16 to 35% for French-
natives, 17 to 64% for African-natives). Interestingly, the pattern across
grades is the opposite of parents’ occupation: the importance of “late at
school” is higher at low grades. Early cognitive skills play therefore a slightly
lower role in higher education attainments than high school attainments, but
the impact remains significant.
15Unfortunately, Ge´ne´ration 98 does not include any information about parental income
level, nor the precise educational level or the parents. Also, the language (French) profi-
ciency of the parents is unknown. Nevertheless, our results and the good fit of our model
make us confident about the ability of parents’ occupation to account for the parents’
income and skill levels.
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Gender and location have a low explanatory power, compared to other
factors. Nevertheless, gender has a slightly greater impact at low grades (6%
and 14% concerning high school completion for French and African-natives
respectively), and no impact at all for advanced university graduation.
Overall, these results are consistent with the huge impact of long run
factors in explaining schooling attainments, as documented by Cameron and
Heckman (1998), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), and many others.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
6.2 Determinants of the Schooling Gap Between Eth-
nic Groups
As seen earlier, African-natives are much less educated than French-natives.
To analyze the schooling gap between ethnic groups, we merge the simu-
lated education outcomes of French and African-natives. Our objective is to
evaluate if second-generation immigrants tend to obtain more or less school-
ing than their French-natives counterparts, after conditioning on observed
characteristics. Obviously, the answer to this question lies in the difference
between the set of all parameter estimates (including the group specific dis-
tributions of unobserved heterogeneity). Because this entails comparing two
large vectors of parameters with each other, it is not sufficient to examine
these parameters.
One way to answer the question is to estimate the impact of racial origin
on predicted schooling attainments after conditioning on all observed charac-
teristics. This estimation is obtained by calculating the share of the variance
in the schooling attainments likelihood attributable to ethnic origin. The
estimate of the difference between groups will therefore capture differences
in the slope parameters across groups, as well as differences in unobserved
heterogeneity.
Further, to determine if young African-natives are under-educated after
controlling for observed characteristics, we evaluate the schooling attainment
probabilities at the observed characteristics of second-generation immigrants,
for two different sets of parameters (those of French-natives and those of
second-generation immigrants). Then, we compute the difference between
those two schooling attainment probabilities:
∆ Pr(schooling) = EXA [Pr(schooling|X ′Aβ̂F )− Pr(schooling|X ′Aβ̂A)], (1)
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where β̂A and β̂F are the vector of estimated parameters of French and
African-natives respectively (including unobserved heterogeneity parameters),
and XA is the vector of covariates of African-natives. Thus, ∆ Pr(schooling)
measures the gap in schooling attainments between French and African-
natives, when the French-natives’ covariates distribution is fixed to the African-
natives’ one. Hence, it measures the gap due to differences in the parameters’
distributions. A positive gap is associated to a higher schooling attainment
probability for French-natives after controlling for observed covariates.
Table 6 reports the results of the variance decompositions conducted on
the full sample. The relative shares of parents’ occupation, location, gender
and “late at school”, and their evolution across grade levels, are close to the
ones already seen in the separate-sample decompositions. Conditioning on
these observed characteristics, ethnic origin accounts for a small part of the
variance of schooling attainments (3 to 5%). Table 7 reports the difference
in schooling attainments between the two groups computed at the covariates
of second-generation immigrants. The positive differences reported indicate
that, after controlling for observed characteristics, African-natives are still
under-educated (when compared with French-natives).
[TABLE 6 HERE]
[TABLE 7 HERE]
7 Explaining Employment Outcomes
We now examine the determinants of the employment outcomes. As we
did for education, we first analyze outcomes within each ethnic group, and
analyze the differences across groups as a second step. For the within group
analysis, we focus on the impact of schooling, which is treated as endogenous
in our model.
The between group analysis is targeted toward answering the following
question: given parents’ background and education, what is the role of ethnic
origin in explaining the access to secure employment?
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7.1 Within Ethnic Groups
7.1.1 Impact of Schooling
We compute the type specific predicted probabilities of being employed in
a Permanent Contract, employed in a Fixed Term Contract, and being un-
employed. Those probabilities are computed at the sample modes, for the
following three education levels hold at the time of school completion: high
school degree (grade level 2 or 3), higher education drop-out or 2 years higher
education degree (grade level 4 or 5), intermediate or advanced university
degree (grade level 6 or 7). Then, we compute the differences in the employ-
ment outcome probabilities between consecutive education levels and their
standard errors. For each employment outcome, the difference measures the
impact of attaining the next education level on the likelihood of the corre-
sponding outcome, other factors remaining fixed. The impacts on the proba-
bility of being employed in a PC can be interpreted as “returns to schooling”
on the incidence of permanent employment. This expression usually refers
to earnings returns to an investment in education. As an illustration, Aeber-
hardt et al. (in press) report higher marginal returns to schooling on wages
for French-natives than for second-generation immigrants from Africa, ex-
cept at the highest grade (university graduation). Here, we do not focus
on returns on earnings, but we study whether or not investing in education
increases the likelihood of being employed in a PC. This issue is of particular
interest if workers on the labor market attach more value to jobs offering a
stable employment situation.
Table 8 contains results for French-natives and Table 9 results for African-
natives. The next subsection discusses the impact of the education level on
employment in a PC and unemployment.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
[TABLE 9 HERE]
Permanent Contracts For French-natives of type 2, dropping-out from
higher education or holding a 2 years higher education degree (grade level 4 or
5) has a negative impact on the PC employment probability (38 percentage
points for the first contract, 33 for the contract at two years), compared
to holding a high school degree (grade levels 2 and 3). However, continuing
educational investment to hold an intermediate or advanced university degree
(grade level 6 or 7) has a positive impact (40 and 34 percentage points).
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Those numerical effects have to be interpreted as upper bounds for the whole
French-natives sample, since the differences for type 1s have most of the time
a reverse sign with a much lower magnitude, which makes them sometimes
insignificant.
Concerning African-natives, the high values of the standard errors make
the estimates imprecise. Only the difference in the likelihood of obtaining a
PC as a first contract between drop-out or 2 years’s degree in higher education
and 3 years and more higher education degree for type 2s is significant and
high (85 percentage points).
Unemployment/Out of the Labor Force Increasing the education level
has a positive impact on the French-natives probability of being unemployed
during the first year after schooling. Indeed, dropping-out from higher educa-
tion or holding a 2 years higher education degree increases the probability by
3 percentage points for type 1s and 12 percentage points for type 2s, whereas
the impact of holding an intermediate or advanced university degree is small
(non significant for type 1s, 3 percentage points for type 2s). This moderate
positive impact can be explained by the fact that more educated workers
search longer for a permanent position and have a lower propensity to accept
FTCs early after school completion. This explanation is also supported by
the impact of schooling two years after school completion: the impact of
dropping-out or holding a 2 years degree in higher education is negative for
type 1s and positive for type 2s (10 percentage points in both cases) and the
impact of holding a 3 year or more higher education degree has the opposite
sign for both types (increase of 10 percentage points for type 1s and decrease
of 14 percentage points for type 2s).
Again, for African-natives, results are barely significant. We can only
note that there is a huge negative impact of dropping-out or holding a 2
years degree in higher education on the probability of remaining unemployed
during the first year after schooling for type 2s (76 percentage points).
7.1.2 Importance of Schooling vs. Permanent Factors
We now determine the importance of schooling, relative to other factors, in
explaining the employment outcomes. We conduct a variance decomposition
of the permanent employment likelihood. We regress the simulated PC out-
come dummy on each group of explanatory factors separately and compute
the share of each factor as the ratio between the corresponding R2 and the
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sum of R2s of each regression. “Simulated schooling” is added as a new
group of explanatory factors, on top of the groups already introduced in the
variance decomposition of the schooling attainments: parents’ occupation,
location, gender, “late at school” and unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 10 contains the results of this variance decomposition for French
and African-natives separately. Schooling explains a large portion of the per-
manent employment likelihood compared to other explanatory factors (more
than 50% for French-natives, and more than 30% for African-natives). How-
ever, unobserved heterogeneity is also an important determinant: it explains
16 to 20% of the permanent employment probability variance for French-
natives and 30 to 40% for African-natives (as high as schooling). The variable
“late at school” has a very small impact on the contractual outcomes (6%
and less). This confirms that this variable has to be interpreted mostly as a
measure of cognitive skills (as opposed to some sort of labor market skill),
since we already noticed in section 6.1 that its impact on schooling attain-
ments was important. Gender and urban location are explaining a marginal
part of employment outcomes (less than 5%).
[TABLE 10 HERE]
7.2 Between Ethnic Groups
We now determine the role of ethnic origin in explaining the probability of
permanent employment once observed characteristics and schooling attain-
ments are controlled for. To this end, we proceed as we did for schooling.
We first merge the simulated employment outcomes of French and African-
natives and estimate the impact of racial origin on the predicted permanent
employment outcome, after conditioning on schooling (simulated) and on
all observed characteristics (parents’ occupation, location, gender and the
“late at school” indicator). The impact attributed to ethnic origin there-
fore measures differences in slope parameters and unobserved heterogeneity
distributions.
Table 11 reports the share of each explanatory factor in explaining the
variance in the permanent employment probability. Schooling attainments
explain 66% of the cross-sectional variance in employment under a Permanent
Contract for the first job after schooling. Its impact decreases to 61% for
the job two years after the exit from school. Other observed factors’ impacts
are close to the ones found in the variance decomposition conducted on the
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two samples separately. Ethnic origin accounts for 3% of the differences in
permanent employment access for the first job, and 6% for the job at two
years.
[TABLE 11 HERE]
8 Testing Equality in Access to Permanent
Employment
As a natural consequence of the analysis presented earlier, it is interesting
to investigate the statistical significance of the racial differences in access to
permanent employment. After all, the point estimates reported earlier seem
to imply relatively modest racial differences, after conditioning on schooling
and observed covariates. In this section, we ask a precise question. Assum-
ing similar observed characteristics across groups, and for a fixed level of
schooling, do differences in parameters between groups entail a significant
difference in access to permanent employment?
In order to do so, we compute differences in permanent employment prob-
abilities between two distinct groups that share African-natives’ covariates.
One group is characterized by the parameters estimated for French-natives,
while the other is characterized by the parameters of African-natives. The
probabilities are computed at three different schooling levels: high school
completion (which corresponds to level 3), first degree in higher education
(level 5) and advanced university degree (level 7). More precisely, the PC
employment difference given stopping schooling investment at grade g takes
the following expression:
∆ Pr(PC|g) = EXA [Pr(PC|X ′Aβ̂F , g)− Pr(PC|X ′Aβ̂A, g)]. (2)
As for education outcomes, a positive (negative) value for this expression
will imply that second-generation immigrants are under (over) represented
in jobs that offer permanent contracts.
Table 12 shows that the conditional gap between French-natives and
second-generation immigrants is never significant, except at the highest edu-
cational level (advanced university degree), for the first employment contract
within the first year that follows school completion. In that situation, the
difference is negative and high (43 percentage points with a standard error of
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0.054), which means that African-natives have a better access to permanent
employment. At all other levels, the value of the standard error is roughly
as high as the one of the difference, which signifies that French and African-
natives’s permanent employment probabilities are not statistically different,
once observed factors are controlled for. Obviously, those results have to
be put in perspectives with the fact that a very low proportion (2.5%) of
African-natives attains the highest education level.
[TABLE 12 HERE]
9 Interpretation and Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, two policy questions are particularly interest-
ing. First, given parents’ background, do second-generation immigrants ob-
tain more or less schooling than their French-natives counterparts? Second,
given parents’ background and education, do second-generation immigrants
have more or less access to secure employment than their French-natives
counterparts?
In order to answer the first question, we use the predicted level of school-
ing and the predicted Permanent Contract outcome for each group obtained
from the model estimated separately for each group (summary found in Ta-
bles 3 and 4). Then, the first question is answered by calculating the impact
of racial origin on predicted schooling after conditioning on parents’ occu-
pation, location, gender and the “late at school” indicator (Tables 6 and
7).
To answer the second question, we calculated the impact of racial origin
on the predicted Permanent Contract outcome after controlling for schooling
and the same observed factors (Tables 11 and 12). In both cases, the esti-
mate of the difference between groups therefore captures differences in model
parameters across groups, as well as differences in unobserved heterogeneity.
When comparing French-natives to second-generation immigrants, three
results are striking:
1. Second-generation immigrants are slightly under-educated, after condi-
tioning on their observable characteristics. Racial origin accounts for a
small portion (5% or less) of differences in the probability of accessing
higher education.
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2. Controlling for observed characteristics and schooling attainments, eth-
nic origin explains between 3% and 6% of the cross-sectional variance
in the permanent employment probability.
3. Given their observed characteristics, second-generation immigrants who
obtain the highest level of education possible, have a faster access to
permanent employment than French-natives. At all other grade levels,
we can not reject the equality of permanent employment probabilities
between French-natives and second-generation immigrants.
How should these results be interpreted? As stated earlier, we believe
that it is informative to interpret our results within a theoretical framework
where second-generation immigrants are rationale, and forward looking.
• One possible explanation has to do with discrimination or, put differ-
ently, a racial difference in returns to skills. Young individuals who
face a discriminatory environment (lower returns to skills) may decide
to under-invest in education. This type of behavior has indeed been
advanced as a possible explanation for the racial education gap ob-
served in the US (Keane and Wolpin, 2000). However, the very small
differences in counterfactual employment probabilities between groups
raise serious doubts about the incidence of unequal treatment across
groups, after conditioning on human capital.
• A second explanation has to do with racial differences in pre-market
factors and parental inputs. To the extent that differences in unob-
served heterogeneity measure differences in parental investment behav-
ior and/or differences in non-cognitive skills, young individuals from
African origins respond to their pre-market endowments by accumulat-
ing less schooling than French-natives. Subsequently, if labor market
outcomes are affected by those skills and factors, even after condi-
tioning on schooling, it is natural to expect a lower access to stable
employment.
While these two hypotheses cannot be distinguished without access to
more data on parental inputs and the like, it is nevertheless interesting to
note that the gap in permanent employment between French-natives and
African-natives is mostly dominated by differences in schooling, and to a
lesser extent, to differences in parental background.
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Overall, these results point out to the fact that the racial gap in em-
ployment outcomes is the mirror image of the racial schooling gap. At a
policy level, we draw the following conclusions. While policies targeted to-
ward reducing discrimination should be maintained, the bulk of effort should
largely be concentrated at policies targeting schooling attainments of non-
French-natives. As is already recognized in the economic literature devoted
to children skill accumulation Todd and Wolpin (2007), those policies have
to focus on improving both the family and the social environments of those
young individuals.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Ethnic Groups
French-Natives African-Natives
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Education Level
1: No qualification 0.060 0.237 0.210 0.408
2: Vocational high school degree 0.225 0.418 0.332 0.471
3: High school degree 0.147 0.354 0.097 0.296
4: Some higher education (not graduate) 0.108 0.310 0.174 0.380
5: 2 years higher education degree 0.207 0.405 0.102 0.303
6: Intermediate univeristy degree 0.136 0.343 0.058 0.234
7: Advanced univeristy degree 0.118 0.322 0.026 0.158
Average education level 4.057 1.842 2.903 1.638
First employment contract within the first year after school completion
Permanent Contract 0.232 0.422 0.139 0.346
Fixed Term Contract 0.605 0.489 0.592 0.492
Out of the labour force / unemployed 0.164 0.370 0.268 0.443
Employment contract two years after school completion
Permanent Contract 0.420 0.494 0.235 0.424
Fixed Term Contract 0.406 0.491 0.463 0.499
Out of the labour force / unemployed 0.175 0.380 0.302 0.459
Father’s occupation in 1998
Craftsman, tradesman, company director 0.114 0.317 0.059 0.235
Senior executive, ingineer, teacher 0.199 0.399 0.019 0.135
Technician, middle manager 0.097 0.297 0.025 0.155
White collar 0.290 0.454 0.221 0.415
Blue collar 0.206 0.405 0.532 0.499
House-husband, missing or deceased 0.094 0.292 0.145 0.352
Mother’s occupation in 1998
Craftswoman, tradeswoman, company director 0.046 0.210 0.010 0.101
Senior executive, engineer, teacher 0.116 0.321 0.007 0.080
Technician, middle manager 0.053 0.224 0.011 0.103
White collar 0.523 0.499 0.241 0.428
Blue collar 0.101 0.301 0.064 0.244
Housewife, missing or deceased 0.161 0.367 0.668 0.471
Living in an urban area in 1998 0.786 0.410 0.925 0.264
Delay during primary school 0.200 0.400 0.445 0.497
Male 0.509 0.500 0.522 0.500
Age in 1998 21.815 3.150 20.738 2.796
Observations 40,525 2,149
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Table 2: Log-Likelihood and Bayesian Information Criterion Values for
Model Selection
French-natives African-natives
log(L) BIC log(L) BIC
First employment outcome within the first year
4 types -101,682.95 206,644.29 -4,840.78 12,030.97
3 types -101,725.66 206,528.13 -4,861.491 11,948.08
2 types -101,725.79 206,326.80 -4,859.55 11,798.42
Employment outcome at two years
4 types -105,442.53 214,163.45 -5,070.14 12,511.16
3 types -105,453.55 213,983.91 -5,077.89 12,380.89
2 types -105,481.34 213,837.91 -5,101.28 12,281.88
aThis log-likelihood value is lower than the corresponding one for the 2 type specifica-
tion since one of the 3 type probabilities is equal to 0.
Note: The number of estimated parameters of each specification is 309 for the model
with 4 types, 290 for the model with 3 types and 271 for the model with 2 types.
Table 3: Simulated Grade Distribution by Ethnic Groups
Grade French-natives African-natives
Average Type 1 Type 2 Average Type 1 Type 2
1 0.059 0.088 0.000 0.203 0.104 0.304
2 0.227 0.315 0.051 0.335 0.514 0.153
3 0.147 0.142 0.157 0.098 0.135 0.060
4 0.106 0.109 0.101 0.185 0.104 0.267
5 0.207 0.152 0.314 0.101 0.081 0.122
6 0.137 0.122 0.169 0.054 0.058 0.049
7 0.118 0.073 0.207 0.025 0.004 0.046
Average
Grade 4.060 3.579 5.013 2.906 2.735 3.079
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Table 4: Simulated Employment Outcomes Distribution by Ethnic Groups
Outcome French-natives African-natives
Average Type 1 Type 2 Average Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
PC 0.240 0.207 0.302 0.158 0.217 0.081
FTC 0.610 0.655 0.527 0.610 0.645 0.565
Out 0.150 0.138 0.171 0.232 0.138 0.354
Employment outcome at two years
PC 0.435 0.382 0.509 0.269 0.178 0.352
FTC 0.404 0.477 0.300 0.477 0.600 0.365
Out 0.161 0.141 0.191 0.254 0.222 0.283
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of Schooling Attainments by Ethnic Groups
French-natives (%) African-natives (%)
Reaching level 3 or more (high school completion)
Parents’ occupation 21 8
Living in an urban area 5 5
Gender 6 14
Late at school 35 59
Unobserved heterogeneity 33 14
Reaching level 5 or more (higher education degree)
Parents’ occupation 30 13
Living in an urban area 8 10
Gender 4 5
Late at school 31 64
Unobserved heterogeneity 27 8
Reaching level 7 or more (advanced university degree)
Parents’ occupation 52 55
Living in an urban area 9 3
Gender 0 0
Late at school 16 17
Unobserved heterogeneity 23 25
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Table 6: Variance Decomposition of Schooling Attainments for the Full Sam-
ple
Reaching level 3 or more (high school completion)
Origin 5%
Parents’ occupation 31%
Living in an urban area 5%
Gender 8%
Late at school 51%
Reaching level 5 or more (higher education degree)
Origin 5%
Parents’ occupation 40%
Living in an urban area 9%
Gender 5%
Late at school 41%
Reaching level 7 or more (advanced university degree)
Origin 3%
Parents’ occupation 65%
Living in an urban area 10%
Gender 1%
Late at school 21%
Table 7: Difference in Schooling Attainments Between Ethnic Groups After
Controlling for Observed Factors
∆ Pr(s ≥ 3) (high school completion) 0.083 (0.095)
∆ Pr(s ≥ 5) (higher education diploma) 0.100 (0.053)
∆ Pr(s ≥ 7) (high level college degree) 0.030 (0.014)
Note 1: ∆ Pr(schooling) is the averaged difference in schooling probabilities between
French and African-natives, computed at the African-natives’ covariates (equation (1)).
Note 2: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using parametric bootstrap.
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Table 8: Schooling Returns: French-Natives
Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) 0.050 (0.013) -0.376 (0.017)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) -0.076 (0.017) 0.258 (0.019)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) 0.026 (0.011) 0.118 (0.014)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) -0.034 (0.026) 0.398 (0.014)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) 0.026 (0.021) -0.428 (0.016)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) 0.008 (0.016) 0.030 (0.011)
Employment outcome at two years
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) 0.166 (0.038) -0.330 (0.013)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) -0.069 (0.023) 0.228 (0.013)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) -0.097 (0.018) 0.101 (0.009)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) -0.106 (0.013) 0.344 (0.011)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) 0.011 (0.012) -0.201 (0.010)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) 0.095 (0.006) -0.143 (0.008)
Note 1: Predicted probabilities are computed for a man having a white collar father,
a white collar mother, living in an urban area and not having been delayed at school.
Note 2: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using parametric bootstrap.
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Table 9: Schooling Returns: African-Natives
Type 1 Type 2
First employment outcome within the first year
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) 0.305 (0.358) -0.013 (0.035)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) -0.643 (0.785) 0.771 (0.145)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) 0.338 (0.612) -0.757 (0.144)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) -0.471 (0.280) 0.851 (0.094)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) 0.579 (0.636) -0.763 (0.086)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) -0.107 (0.523) -0.088 (0.087)
Employment outcome at two years
Pr(PC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(PC|s = 2, 3) -0.240 (0.649) -0.064 (0.317)
Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5)− Pr(FTC|s = 2, 3) 0.336 (0.407) 0.106 (0.168)
Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5)− Pr(OUT|s = 2, 3) -0.096 (0.481) -0.041 (0.232)
Pr(PC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(PC|s = 4, 5) 0.399 (0.370) 0.133 (0.141)
Pr(FTC|s = 6, 7)− Pr(FTC|s = 4, 5) -0.537 (0.356) -0.056 (0.125)
Pr(OUT|s = 6, 7)− Pr(OUT|s = 4, 5) 0.137 (0.194) -0.077 (0.101)
Note 1: Predicted probabilities are computed for a man having a white collar father,
an unemployed mother, living in an urban area and not having been delayed at school.
Note 2: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using parametric bootstrap.
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Table 10: Variance Decomposition of Obtaining a Permanent Contract by
Ethnic Groups
French-natives (%) African-natives (%)
First employment outcome within the first year
Parents’ occupation 18 35
Living in an urban area 5 2
Gender 1 0
Late at school 2 1
Unobserved heterogeneity 16 30
Simulated schooling 58 32
Employment outcome at two years
Parents’ occupation 14 15
Living in an urban area 2 3
Gender 4 2
Late at school 6 0
Unobserved heterogeneity 20 40
Simulated schooling 54 40
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Table 11: Variance Decomposition of Obtaining a Permanent Contract for
the Full Sample
First employment outcome within the first year
Origin 3%
Parents’ occupation 22%
Living in an urban area 5%
Gender 1%
Late at school 3%
Simulated schooling 66%
Employment outcome at two years
Origin 6%
Parents’ occupation 19%
Living in an urban area 2%
Gender 4%
Late at school 8%
Simulated schooling 61%
Table 12: Difference in Permanent Employment Between Ethnic Groups Af-
ter Controlling for Observed Factors
First employment outcome within the first year
∆ Pr(PC|g = 3) (high school completion) 0.034 (0.215)
∆ Pr(PC|g = 5) (higher education diploma) -0.043 (0.089)
∆ Pr(PC|g = 7) (high level college graduate) -0.431 (0.054)
Employment outcome at two years
∆ Pr(PC|g = 3) (high school completion) 0.016 (0.270)
∆ Pr(PC|g = 5) (higher education diploma) 0.288 (0.209)
∆ Pr(PC|g = 7) (high level college graduate) -0.092 (0.223)
Note 1: ∆ Pr(PC|g) is the averaged difference in permanent employment probabilities
at grade g between French and African-natives, computed at the African-natives’ covariates
(equation (2)).
Note 2: In parenthesis: Standard errors computed using parametric bootstrap.
36
